I helped dad in this, liked it, so publishing. A detailed account later.
Performance of the 45 Cavalry Regiment during the Bangladesh
War – December 1971 - specially A Squadron.
by Major General Rajendra Nath, PVSM (Retd)
The 45 Cavalry fought fierce and successful battles during the Bangladesh War in 1971 and earned a very good name for itself as a fighting unit. The 45 Cavalry was placed under the command of 2 Corps, which attacked erstwhile East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) from the Western side. 2 Corps had two Divisions, 4 Mountain Division and 9 Infantry Division which were to attack East Pakistan from the Western side. The main objective was to advance towards Dacca. The 4 Mountain Division consisted of the 7 ,41 and 62 Mountain Brigades. I commanded the 62 Mountain Brigade during the war and the "A" Squadron of 45 Cavalry was allotted to the Brigade for some Operations during the 1971 Bangladesh War. The "A" Sqn was ably commanded by Maj PK Batra (later Maj Gen Batra). Maj Batra, a capable and a brave Squadron Commander as I distinctly remember, provided close and effective support to every action / attack launched by my Brigade and the various Battalions of my Brigade as well as to the Battalions of 7 and 41 Mountain Brigades as and when tasked to do so.
The first attack by my Brigade was on Jibannagar, which was
the curtain raiser of initiation of operations by 4 Mtn Div, it was a very
successful attack by Infantry supported by tanks. A battle which also needs
special mention is the Battle of Swadhi. Pakistan’s 50 Punjab Battalion had
taken up well prepared defensive position on a high ground which could not be
assaulted by tanks due to the difficult terrain. Inspite of the difficult
terrain and the anti-tank mines laid by the enemy, two troops of the A Sqn of
45 Cavalry gave accurate and effective fire support knocking out many enemy
bunkers. This was a well fought battle in which the 50 Punjab Battalion of
Pakistan left behind 50 casualties (all dead) in their defensive positions when
they ultimately withdrew.
The capture of Magura was the
next task allotted to my Brigade after Jhenida had been captured. The A Squadron less two troops,
a company of Skots less a platoon with 5 Maratha Light Infantry (MLI) were
ordered to capture Magura. After the fall
of Jhenida, the Pakistani forces had pulled back to take up defensive positions
at Magura. This Combat group moved so fast that it was reminiscent of a Blitzkreig
and surprised the enemy forces totally and they had to abandon Magura and fall
back behind a water obstacle. Magura was captured much before the time allotted
for its capture. The role of the armoured complement in this operation was as
crucial as that of the other elemets.
However, the mother of all
battles was the crossing of the River Madhumati and the capture of Kamarkhali.
Two battalions of the Pakistan 9 Infantry Division had taken up positions on
the West Bank of the Madhumati River at Kumarkhali / Arpara. The Madhumati River was 500 yards wide
at this point with a water depth of 15 to 20 feet and a water current of 4
Knots. Deliberations and assessment led me to realize that any delay in
crossing of the river would give ample time to consolidate, this was towards
the closing days of the war. We were aware by then that pressures may come from
international sources for a ceasefire. On the night 14/ 15 December 1971 I
took a decision to cross the Madhumati River and to launch the attack.
It was a difficult decision
to take, for even the Russians who had sold the light tanks to India (which we
were using all along as the 45 Cavalry was equipped with them) had never actually
crossed in the amphibious mode a large river like the Madhumati. The tanks were
essentially designed for limited amphibious operations. On the other hand, launching
the attack across the river without our tanks giving close support would certainly
have been a costly and difficult affair. This was seriously deliberated upon by
us along with the options. I decided to take the risk because battles are won only
by taking risks and any battle without support from tanks would have cost us
many more casualties. I decided to sit as Brigade Commander on the leading tank
as we went in as the environment we were operating in was quite stressful. The
crossing had to be successful for enabling success in the subsequent battle.
Luckily,
the A Squadron had already carried out the requisite pre- floatation checks and
the troops were in great spirits. This
was an encouraging sign and evident of the training and self confidence. The Squadron
Commander (Major PK Batra) himself chose to sit in the driver’s seat, clearly leading
by example, with me sitting (as Bde Cdr) on the deck of the leading tank. It
was a tense period for us that night, with prayers on our lips, as the leading
tank plunged into the river and started moving across. By and by all tanks
moved into the river, in formation and as per the protocol. Meanwhile the
infantry waited, as they would mainly follow only after the tanks had crossed over.
With great skill and dexterity the Sqn Cdr moved through the choppy river waters,
guided by the recce (reconnaissance) troop boys, who had already sited the
crossing place on that pitch dark night. We had to maintain total silence so as
to avoid alerting the enemy. It was a harrowing experience
as the tanks after successfully navigating the river found the gradients of the
river bank a bit steep. As they say fortune or luck favours the brave and the
tanks were ultimately across the river and the river banks with the infantry,
the doughty Gorkhas of the 2/9 Gorkha Rifles following up closely in country
boats. Next morning, with the accurate and effective support of the tanks (led
very ably by Major PK Batra)the brave Gorkhas and their full throated war cry
surprised the enemy forces and we thus succeeded in the capture of the stated objective
quite within our planned parameters.
The Pakistani Officers we interacted with later could not believe that tanks had crossed over such a wide river, undetected right under their nose. A tribute to 45 Cavalry for their grit, daring and professionalism. Rightly so, an officer of the Pakistan Army at surrender called them Tank Commandos !
The
presence of tanks subsequently enabled other battalions, specially the 4 Sikh
Light Infantry (SikhLI) to carry out a successful attack on the Pak Battalion
deployed in the rear of the battle zone thus making the 62 Mountain Brigade
attack highly successful.
This was
the first time the light tanks had crossed by the amphibious mode a large river
in the Bangaldesh War. Incidentally, even in the earlier wars, tanks of the
Indian Army had not carried out such a major amphibious river crossing
operation. No wonder 62 Mountain Brigade has been converted into 62 Armoured
Brigade by Army HQ. The credit for this goes to the 45 Cavalry Regiment for
it’s excellent performance in the 1971 Indo-Pak War.
After the battle of Kumarkhali, Maj Gen Ansari, GOC of the Pak
9 Inf Div surrendered to me along with his Divisional Staff. He came for
surrender without his badges of rank though all other officers were wearing
their uniforms properly. When
questioned, he told me that as per his information the Indian Army Officers
would take off his badges of rank and belt before surrender and so he had taken
off his badges of rank and the belt on his own before surrendering to the
Indian Army! I assured him that the Indian Army treats the POW's in a dignified
manner.
Maj Gen Ansari told me that when he was informed by his
troops that Indian Tanks along with the Infantry were attacking their positions
across the River Madhumati he was completely surprised, as were the Pakistani
troops who were facing the combined and coordinated assault of the Indian
infantry and tanks. No wonder the battle at Kumarkhali forced General Ansari to
surrender to the Indian Army so quickly.
However, I must
say with a regret that I feel deeply even today that the 45 Cavalry and the "A"
Squadron in particular did not get their due share of gallantry awards which
they so rightly and richly deserved. Such is the fog of war, specially when
troops are distributed from an integrated unit and some operations just recede
from memory.
In fact the amphibious river
crossing operation at the Madhumati
River inclusive of the circumstances at the time, the risk assessment taken up,
the coordination with other units, the impact of training and leadership, and
the role of the Squadron Commander deserve much more recognition and study. This
operation is certainly unique and deserves to be studied. It’s high time this
is taken up in detail while the officers and men from the Squadron and the
units it coordinated it’s actions with are still amongst us.
I wish this gallant Regiment a
bright future in the coming years.
Maj Gen
Rajendra Nath, PVSM ( Retd )
(62
Mountain Brigade Commander in the 1971 War).
April 2016.
Comments
Post a Comment