45 Cavalry - A Squadron - 1971 War

The 1971 War - 45 Cavalry A Squadron

Today is the Day when War was officially declared way back in 1971. But the 2/9 GR states in it's Momento presented to my father after the war,
"In Memory of the Battles we fought together"
21st November 1971 - 16th December 1971.
Between facts and declarations facts win, my Father commanding 62 Mountain Brigade was well within the erstwhile East Pakistan Boundary / Borders on 3rd December 1971. He had the 5 Maratha Light Infantry, the 4 Sikh Light Infantry, The 2/9 GR and an Armoured Unit under his command. The official declaration of war was welcomed by cheers as some forward elements could remove their lungis or rather dhotis wrapped over their uniforms.

Here is one piece written by by father last year at the request of the 45 Cavalry and then Major Batra. I have edited it.

Performance of the 45 Cavalry Regiment during the Bangladesh War – December 1971 - specially A Squadron.
by Major General Rajendra Nath, PVSM (Retd)

The 45 Cavalry fought fierce and successful battles during the Bangladesh War in 1971 and earned a very good name for itself as a fighting unit. The 45 Cavalry was placed under the command of 2 Corps, which attacked erstwhile East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) from the Western side. 2 Corps had two Divisions, 4 Mountain Division and 9 Infantry Division which were to attack East Pakistan from the Western side. The main objective was to advance towards Dacca. The 4 Mountain Division consisted of the 7 ,41 and 62 Mountain Brigades. I commanded the 62 Mountain Brigade during the war and the "A" Squadron of 45 Cavalry was allotted to the Brigade for some Operations during the 1971 Bangladesh War. The "A" Sqn was ably commanded by Maj PK Batra (later Maj Gen Batra). Maj Batra, a capable and a brave Squadron Commander as I distinctly remember, provided close and effective support to every action / attack launched by my Brigade and the various Battalions of my Brigade as well as to the Battalions of 7 and 41 Mountain Brigades as and when tasked to do so.

The first attack by my Brigade was on Jibannagar, which was the curtain raiser of initiation of operations by 4 Mtn Div, it was a very successful attack by Infantry supported by tanks. A battle which also needs special mention is the Battle of Swadhi. Pakistan’s 50 Punjab Battalion had taken up well prepared defensive position on a high ground which could not be assaulted by tanks due to the difficult terrain. Inspite of the difficult terrain and the anti-tank mines laid by the enemy, two troops of the A Sqn of 45 Cavalry gave accurate and effective fire support knocking out many enemy bunkers. This was a well fought battle in which the 50 Punjab Battalion of Pakistan left behind 50 casualties (all dead) in their defensive positions when they ultimately withdrew.

The capture of Magura was the next task allotted to my Brigade after Jhenida had been captured. The A Squadron less two troops, a company of Skots less a platoon with 5 Maratha Light Infantry (MLI) were ordered to capture Magura. After the fall of Jhenida, the Pakistani forces had pulled back to take up defensive positions at Magura. This Combat group moved so fast that it was reminiscent of a Blitzkreig and surprised the enemy forces totally and they had to abandon Magura and fall back behind a water obstacle. Magura was captured much before the time allotted for its capture. The role of the armoured complement in this operation was as crucial as that of the other elemets.

However, the mother of all battles was the crossing of the River Madhumati and the capture of Kamarkhali. Two battalions of the Pakistan 9 Infantry Division had taken up positions on the West Bank of the Madhumati River at Kumarkhali / Arpara. The Madhumati River was 500 yards wide at this point with a water depth of 15 to 20 feet and a water current of 4 Knots. Deliberations and assessment led me to realize that any delay in crossing of the river would give ample time to consolidate, this was towards the closing days of the war. We were aware by then that pressures may come from international sources for a ceasefire. On the night 14/ 15 December 1971 I took a decision to cross the Madhumati River and to launch the attack.

It was a difficult decision to take, for even the Russians who had sold the light tanks to India (which we were using all along as the 45 Cavalry was equipped with them) had never actually crossed in the amphibious mode a large river like the Madhumati. The tanks were essentially designed for limited amphibious operations. On the other hand, launching the attack across the river without our tanks giving close support would certainly have been a costly and difficult affair. This was seriously deliberated upon by us along with the options. I decided to take the risk because battles are won only by taking risks and any battle without support from tanks would have cost us many more casualties. I decided to sit as Brigade Commander on the leading tank as we went in as the environment we were operating in was quite stressful. The crossing had to be successful for enabling success in the subsequent battle.

Luckily, the A Squadron had already carried out the requisite pre- floatation checks and the troops were in great spirits. This was an encouraging sign and evident of the training and self confidence. The Squadron Commander (Major PK Batra) himself chose to sit in the driver’s seat, clearly leading by example, with me sitting (as Bde Cdr) on the deck of the leading tank. It was a tense period for us that night, with prayers on our lips, as the leading tank plunged into the river and started moving across. By and by all tanks moved into the river, in formation and as per the protocol. Meanwhile the infantry waited, as they would mainly follow only after the tanks had crossed over. With great skill and dexterity the Sqn Cdr moved through the choppy river waters, guided by the recce (reconnaissance) troop boys, who had already sited the crossing place on that pitch dark night. We had to maintain total silence so as to avoid alerting the enemy. It was a harrowing experience as the tanks after successfully navigating the river found the gradients of the river bank a bit steep. As they say fortune or luck favours the brave and the tanks were ultimately across the river and the river banks with the infantry, the doughty Gorkhas of the 2/9 Gorkha Rifles following up closely in country boats. Next morning, with the accurate and effective support of the tanks (led very ably by Major PK Batra)the brave Gorkhas and their full throated war cry surprised the enemy forces and we thus succeeded in the capture of the stated objective quite within our planned parameters.

The Pakistani Officers we interacted with later could not believe that tanks had crossed over such a wide river, undetected right under their nose. A tribute to 45 Cavalry for their grit, daring and professionalism. Rightly so, an officer of the Pakistan Army at surrender called them Tank Commandos !

The presence of tanks subsequently enabled other battalions, specially the 4 Sikh Light Infantry (SikhLI) to carry out a successful attack on the Pak Battalion deployed in the rear of the battle zone thus making the 62 Mountain Brigade attack highly successful.

This was the first time the light tanks had crossed by the amphibious mode a large river in the Bangaldesh War. Incidentally, even in the earlier wars, tanks of the Indian Army had not carried out such a major amphibious river crossing operation. No wonder 62 Mountain Brigade has been converted into 62 Armoured Brigade by Army HQ. The credit for this goes to the 45 Cavalry Regiment for it’s excellent performance in the 1971 Indo-Pak War.

After the battle of Kumarkhali, Maj Gen Ansari, GOC of the Pak 9 Inf Div surrendered to me along with his Divisional Staff. He came for surrender without his badges of rank though all other officers were wearing their uniforms properly. When questioned, he told me that as per his information the Indian Army Officers would take off his badges of rank and belt before surrender and so he had taken off his badges of rank and the belt on his own before surrendering to the Indian Army! I assured him that the Indian Army treats the POW's in a dignified manner.

Maj Gen Ansari told me that when he was informed by his troops that Indian Tanks along with the Infantry were attacking their positions across the River Madhumati he was completely surprised, as were the Pakistani troops who were facing the combined and coordinated assault of the Indian infantry and tanks. No wonder the battle at Kumarkhali forced General Ansari to surrender to the Indian Army so quickly.

However, I must say with a regret that I feel deeply even today that the 45 Cavalry and the "A" Squadron in particular did not get their due share of gallantry awards which they so rightly and richly deserved. Such is the fog of war, specially when troops are distributed from an integrated unit and some operations just recede from memory.

In fact the amphibious river crossing operation at the Madhumati River inclusive of the circumstances at the time, the risk assessment taken up, the coordination with other units, the impact of training and leadership, and the role of the Squadron Commander deserve much more recognition and study. This operation is certainly unique and deserves to be studied. It’s high time this is taken up in detail while the officers and men from the Squadron and the units it coordinated it’s actions with are still amongst us.

I wish this gallant Regiment a bright future in the coming years.

Maj Gen Rajendra Nath, PVSM ( Retd )
(62 Mountain Brigade Commander in the 1971 War).
April 2016.