The Forgotten Unsung Heroes of the Battle of Madhumati. 1971. Bangladesh. 45 Cavalry.

 

The Forgotten Unsung Heroes of the Battle of Madhumati. 1971. Bangladesh. 45 Cavalry. By Dinesh K Kapila (Chief General Manager (Retd). NABARD

(As discussed with Major General (then Major) Pramod  Kumar Batra, Retd and Other Veterans)

 

Just a Glimpse – Cdr 62 Mountain Brigade – “Pramod, I believe it is hard to maneuver PT 76 tanks in this terrain and waters”. Pat is the answer, “it is hard and I may struggle, but you will never see me to give up or fai”l. They stood together, on the edge of the swift flowing Madhumati, the staff and soldiers waiting. It was dark. Very Dark. After waiting for some time the Bde Cdr had said, “lets go”. Major PK Batra vividly recollects even now watching the Cdr's face as he looked at the map with a torch. He was calm and very quiet, showing ,no fear or afraid and maintaining a dignified silence. He remembered the old saying, "Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown". It was a moment in not only the life of the Brigade Commander but also the Sqn Cdr, any failure and the years of dedicated service, specially of the Cdr, would be washed away. This thought raced through his mind, with all of a Eleven Years service as they walked to mount the tanks. Before mounting up, the Cdr explained to the young soldiers that the brave soldier is he who conquers fear. Finally, the Cdr said let's go. "Veer Bhogya Vasundhra", the war cry filled the air as Major Batra started his tank. Driving  it himself,  the Bde Cdr sitting resolutely on the hull, and plunged into the choppy river, he gasped at the water coming over the anti-surge vane onto his face and trickling down. It was December. He was wet down till my waist in winter. After driving for sometime, he felt a warm hand on his shoulder, It was none other than the Cdr sitting just outside by his side saying "shaabash, well done", across the years he says, “I was moved and inspired by this gesture” .

Why am I writing this. In fact I have to. This battle has many who fought in it still having regrets about it being rather underplayed.  The Battle had units of the 62 Mountain Brigade, Commanded by my father, Brigadier (later Major General) Rajendra Nath crossing the broad Madhumati River at night on light tanks of the A Squadron of the 45 Cavalry. A  Squadron was commanded by Major (later Major General) PK Batra. This was certainly an unparalleled decisive brave action undertaken during the war and deserves much more recognition. Major General Pramod Kumar Batra has been advocating that this battle ought to have been more recognized by way of gallantry awards. 

My father, for one, always had this regret somewhere in his heart, hidden well, but I knew it. This only came out when he ran into fellow warriors from the battle.   Through the years he carried that hurt inside. I have my own emotions as regards this battle, firstly, many an evening walk over the years with my father was on leadership and decision making but also that life could be unfair too. This battle was what often underlay these aspects at times and of course due recognition not coming his  way for the reconnaissance of Aksai Chin in 1952, when he reported the Chinese interest in the area. Consequently, a dutiful son has decided to bring out this piece. My father's pride was the recognition from his fellow veterans.  This, his own write up, discussions with General Batra and other veterans has brought about this article. I have stayed true to the facts as conveyed to me.  

A couple of points, as stressed by many veterans. Vehemently and emotionally. Point one, the crossing of the River Madhumati was a bold and courageous decision by the Brigade Commander, for all the attendant risks, it was taken in a calm, resolute and objective manner, which motivated the 62 Mountain Brigade and 45 Cavalry. Secondly, the crossing, undertaken at night, actually upset the carefully drawn up defences of the Pakistan Army in that sector, and thirdly, the rapidity of the follow up action resulted in the surrendur of the GOC 9 Pak Inf Div. Somewhere in the ceasefire being declared and the attention on Dacca, this battle faded away. This brave and bold action, by the 62 Mountain Brigade and 45 Cavalry, and the leadership and bravery of the Brigade Commander must be recognised.         

 To revert to the battle proper. As Gen Batra remembers vividly, the day was spent in planning and the crucial night, if you look at the map, then only will a person realise that the decision to cross the rather choppy Madhumati River which was 500 to 700 yards wide, with a water current of over 4 knots, was a brave action, specially as the other bank of river was held by the enemy. Some may even think of it as a bit foolhardy. As he says for all the action, towards the end we held a rather small discussion. The crossing was to take place at midnight. It was a very hard decision. Failure would have put them back by 48 hours or more. The brave Commander (that is, Then Brigadier Rajendra Nath) decided to bite the bullet. The onus now fell on the shoulders of young Maj Batra, Sqn Cdr.  Undaunted Maj Batra sat on the drivers seat of the leading tank and the Brigade Commander said, "well done Batra, I call this Pride in command" and with the Brigade Commander himself on the deck of the tank and he said, "let's go". It requires guts and strong character to take a decision like this and implement it and the Gods of war as Gen Batra says favoured the brave and the Pak 9 Inf Div surrendered to 62 Mountain Brigade.   When decades later, both my father and Gen Batra visited Bangladesh, the Commander (to Maj Gen Batra my father is Cdr always) while addressing the officers did say that, "Maj Batra deserved a gallantry award, maybe even the "PVC"." This is also a tribute from me to all those who were there and selflessly gave the series of battles their best. 

 This action of crossing the Madhumati River at night stealthily under the nose of the enemy is the only one of its kind in the 1971 Operations in the Eastern Sector and actually including the Western sector. General Batra is clear about this. The GOC of the Pakistani 9 Infantry  Division when informed of the tanks having crossed the Madhumati River refused to believe and called it rubbish and  actually stated that the troops who reported it were scared and making up stories. He sent an officer to Kamarkhali where the action was to confirm the same. The officer returned and informed the GOC that tanks had crossed and were supporting the attacks on the Pakistani troops. Thus started the beginning of the process of the surrender by the Pakistani 9 Inf Div. This high risk and by no means an ordinary action/operation deserves to be studied as to the thought which went into conceptualizing it and the planning for it.  And the tough question, What really goes through a soldier’s mind when literally striding towards death, this very few  can understand.

 And then the crucial question posed by Gen Batra to me, “What about the Commander who led and planned the Operation?” Well, all wars have their disturbing or maybe such overlooked operations, across a vast theatre, some action could go less recognized. By the time the really higher echelons realized this, months later, they just let it be.  As I understand after interacting with the veterans from the battle, somewhere in the Corps HQs, grappling with losing out in the chase for Dacca, this got little priority. 

 Well, around 12^th December, A Squadron led by Major PK Batra less two troops were placed under the command of 62 Mountain Brigade, say a day before the battle and ordered to move back to Madhumati, where the 5 Maratha Light Infantry was holding the western bank of Madhumati. They covered approximately 100 kms in about 8 hours or so. In the meantime to make up the tank losses suffered at Kushtia, the 45 Cavlary sent two troops from B Squadron under Maj Chakraverty (Chuks) a brave and a very fine officer. B Squadron had already taken part in a few battles and acquitted themselves with honour. These two troops were placed under command 7 Mountain Brigade. The Eastern bank of Madhumati was held by two battalions of the Pak Army, with elements of a recce and support battalion and artillery. On arrival, they were welcomed by heavy shelling. The boys had got so used to shelling that by listening to the piercing whistle of the sound of an incoming shell through the air, they could guess likely location where the shell was likely to land. If the shell was coming close to their location, their reaction was the equivalent of “Oh Sxxt” and they would hit the ground.  Major Batra had just got back from a recce of Madhumati looking for likely crossing places and got to watch this fun.

Before the battle and the crossing, Maj Batra was very tired and sat on the ground leaning on to the sprocket of his tank and dozed off. After a little while, his tank driver woke him up with a hot cup of tea. This tea is very distinct from the normal tea. It has a bit of kerosene oil, diesel “flavour” with plenty of sugar and it is served hot. One is tempted to ask for another round. It is at this time that a man carrying dead body of a young woman around 20 years or so came and laid it near the tank. He went away and returned after ten minutes carrying the dead body of a newly born baby. He was crying and trying to convey something which they could not understand. His boys gave him some water and he became calm. This Mukti Bahini fighter narrated his sad story. “The previous night three Pak soldiers had come to his cottage, tied him and his wife and raped this young lady who had just delivered this baby. Next morning, villagers came and untied both of them but by then, both mother and child were dead. A week back, his son and son-in-law had been taken away by Pak soldiers for labour work and not returned. It is believed some were shot dead. This harrowing and sad incident upset them. They could do nothing. But the anger was building up. And the resolute action.

Background from D Dasgupta - Troops of the 101 Communication zone were the closest to Dacca and for the 4th Division to close in towards the Padma river to the west of Dacca, the towns of Kamarkhali, Modhukhali and Faridpur, needed to be captured. And to capture the next town- Kamarkhali, came the Madhumati river as an obstruction!  The Brigade didn't have any bridging equipment or the ability to get a Bailey bridge up or anything solid to rely upon to cross the river, but the boys marked out the shallowest part of the river. The shallowest areas were some 15-20 feet deep and some 500 yards across to cross, with the river water current being some 4 knots.  So, Brigadier sahib came up with a really risky idea. He decided that the PT-76 tanks led ably by Maj PK Batra and with him on the tank would ford the river !! Now, PT-76 tanks are light Russian tanks that were suitable for small amphibious operations but for a larger river like Madhumati, it was still horribly risky. Still, the battle was depended on this crossing. On the other side of the river were the 50 Punjab and 38 Frontier Force of the Pakistani army, though not on full strength.

Well, to go back, Major Batra was summoned to headquarter 62 Mountain Brigade where the plans for crossing of Madhumati and capture of Kamarkhali were discussed. He got back after the discussion and ordered his boys to carry out all the 18 pre- floatation checks. The Madhumati was a formidable choppy river which was minimum 500 yards wide, with a depth of 15-20 feet, water current of 4 to 5 knots and steep banks. The Engineer Regiment had done a good job in providing this data. The plan was that the 7 Mountain Brigade was to hold Western Bank of Madhumati with one battalion, establish a firm base on the far bank of the river by morning 15 December and assist 62 Mountain Brigade in the capture of Kamarkhali. The 62 Mountain Brigade was to affect the crossing in the North during the night of 14/15 December and clear the enemy opposition upto the road Magura-Faridpur and resume the advance on the axis Kamarkhali - Goalundo Ghat sooner but not later than first light 17 December. It was a pincer move, with 62 Mountain Brigade in the North and 7 Mountain Brigade in the South. Two troops of B Squadron tanks were allotted to 7 Mountain Brigade and A Squadron 45 Cavalry less two troops were placed under command 62 Mountain Brigade for battle of Madhumati/ Kamarkhali.

Let me emphasise here that I am more inclined to bring out here the human element of the battle and the crossing, this would bring out the bravery of all the soldiers, the young cavalry boys. The infantry youngsters on top of the tanks and the Brigade Commander. As the preparations were underway, as recollected by some of the soldiers, my father (then Brigadier Rajendra Nath) spoke to the young soldiers,, informally at the home bank of the River Madhumati, “Darr to nahin lag raha? So said the Sowar, “jab aap Cdr saab hamare saath hain to darna kya”. And the Cdr asked, “Yeh Darya 500 se 700 gaz hai, par Kar loge”?. Sir Saab Samundar bhi par Kar le ge. then this, by the Cdr, “Leading tank mein main aap ke saath hoonga”. And the NCO said, “Saab hamare Sqn cdr bhi leading tank mein honge jaise Arjun ka rath Krishan ne Chalaya tha (and the boys clapped).

The exchange was as follows, are you afraid, and the soldier responds, when you are with us, where is the fear. And to the  question, this river is 500 yards to 700 yards in width, can you cross it, and the youngsters said, with you, we will cross the sea even. When the Bde Cdr said he would be on the leading tank with them, the NCO said, our Sqn Cdr will be driving the lead tank, as Krishanji drove the chariot of Arjun.  (At this stage there was a call from another battalion, as the Commander went to one side to take it, the  A Sqn boys in unison called out their Regiments motto, "VEER BHOGYA VASUNDHRA". And they went in. with the water drenching Maj Batra.

They had some small talk as they went in. Major Batra as he was then remembers being asked by the Brigade Commander, ‘So Batra why are you driving the tank” and he responded, “Pride in Command, Sir”. My Regimental tradition. The Commander responded, “Leading by example, a damn good tradition of 45 Cav. Do you know the importance of this operation”. The young Major recollects saying, .”yes Sir. I do. we will do our best and won't let you down. Then after some time as they went further in, “How will you know from where to get out” and the Sqn Cdr stating, “Sir, my boys are already across the river with digging tools ,radio set, torches etc to work on the crossing place”. And the response was a simple, “ok, good, let us complete this”.  And there is another heartwarming exchange, to lighten the mood, Gen (then Brig) Rajendra Nath asked loudly so that all could hear, “Batra Saab ke pass driving license hai ya nahin? (Every one burst out laughing.) NCO: Saab CO Saab ne aap ko Paar le Jane ke waste Regt ka best driver bheja hai.(Again loud laughter).(Does Major Batra have a driving license, and the NCO said the Regiment has deputed its best driver to take you across). 

7 Mountain Brigade with one Battalion and a troop of tanks crossed Madhumati River from the south and established behind Kamarkhali. Remaining tanks of B Squadron gave fire support from the west bank. The Commander 62 Mountain Brigade responsible for the northern pincer rightly appreciated that any delay in crossing of Madhumati will give the enemy a chance to consolidate their defences further on this very formidable water obstacle. The plan to cross over had been discussed by them earlier. The plan envisaged by the Brigade HQs was to capture Arpara/ Kamarkhali with 2/9 GR with tanks giving fire support. At mid night, on 14/15 December he decided to cross over the Madhumati river, but the element of surprise and momentum was with them, if it was effected as planned. According to the Brigade Commander, the mother of all battles was the crossing of Madhumati and capture of Kamarkhali. Two Battalions of the Pakistan 9 division had taken up positions on the far bank at Kamarkhali/ Arpara. It was a difficult decision to take as any delay could bring international pressure on India for a cease fire, this news had filtered down. There were indications of American 7th fleet heading for Indian Ocean.

Here I will quote from the “History of the 9th Gorkha Rifles, Indo-Pak War: 1971 page 201”. Brig (Dr) SK Sinha, the author, writes “the description of how the tanks crossed River Madhumati deserves to be told. In the words of Brig Rajendra Nath (Later Maj Gen), the Squadron had already carried out pre floatation checks and boys were in high spirits. The brave squadron commander (Maj PK Batra) sat in the driver’s seat leading by example with me on the deck of leading tank. With prayers on our lips, the leading tank plunged into the river. With great skill and dexterity, the squadron commander moved through the choppy river guided by recce troop. The gradient on the far bank was steep but luck favours the brave. The tanks were across the river with the brave Gorkhas (2/9 Gorkha Rifles) following up in country boats. It was a harrowing experience. “This was the first instance of amphibious tanks swimming across a river obstacle under battle conditions and water current of 5 knots.  It was a major achievement in the employment of PT-76 tanks to cross a formidable water obstacle under battle conditions. The presence of tanks on the far bank had a tremendous effect on the morale of the troops”, according to historian Brig (Dr) SK Sinha (retd). It was a major psychological boost. The momentum was decidedly theirs. They went into battle almost immediately and inflicted heavy casualties.

Discussing in December 2024, says General Batra, “Personally for me, it was a great challenge as there was to be no failure, the success of the whole operation depended on the tanks getting across and supporting the attacks by the infantry”.  The tanks and infantry battalions in both pincers were across Madhumati river.  22 Rajputs with two troops of tanks established a road block behind the enemy by 1100 hours 15 December. The brave Gorkhas of 2/9 Gorkha Rifles supported by Maj Chakraverty (Chucks) tanks attacked ARPARA on the morning of 15 December. The enemy offered stiff resistance but could not hold on against the Gurkhas and with some accurate shooting by tanks. Chucks supported the attacks ably and handled his tanks like a maestro as a series of attacks were launched in succession with support of tanks and all were successful. However, destiny had something different for this brave soldier. One of his tanks got bogged down during a lull in the battle. With total disregard to his personal safety, he got off his tank to supervise the recovery and to tell the 2/9 Gorkha Rifles boys to move away from tanks as the tanks would draw enemy’s fire. Suddenly a mortar bomb landed behind him and he was grievously wounded. His loss was another big blow to Major Batra, as he had not yet recovered from what he calls the “Kushtia shock” (more on this separately). Chucks was a brave compassionate and gentleman officer loved and respected by all in the Regiment.  To the warriors of Madhumati, he is and will always remain in their annals the “Hero” of Kamarkhali. He was evacuated and finally boarded out as he had fractured his spinal cord. A brave gallant officer.  ARPARA was captured by 1400 hrs on 15th December, with the A Sqn supporting a hard fought battle.

D Dasgupta writes - The 4th Sikh Light infantry crossed first on the tanks while local Bengalis voluntarily gave their boats for the others to cross. The boys of the 2/9 Gorkhas hopped on these boats and crossed the river. And not a single tank or infantry, was lost in the crossing! The Pakistani army and even young officers of the Brigade, were not sure whether they would be able to cross the river, but these brave boys had achieved more than what they expected!! The 4 Sikh Light infantry crossed and rallied up behind the enemy positions, while the 2/9 GR and the tanks lined up for the attack. As the dawn of 16 December cracked up with the first sunrise of a liberated Bangladesh, the valiant Gorkhas screamed and charged at the enemy, with the PT-76 tanks forming up the backbone of the attack. The bewildered Pakistanis, being scared shitless and surprised, were no match for this Blitzkrieged style attack and were smashed in their defenses. Meanwhile, from the rear, the Sikh Light infantry kept cutting through their defenses, distracting and reducing the enemy's counter fire on the tanks and the Gorkhas.

Then they received reports that the enemy was escaping by using a track north of the 22 Rajput road block. The Commander 62 Mountain Brigade ordered Major PK Batra to move with a Company of the 5 Maratha Light Infantry to establish another road block to trap the enemy. Major Batra took one tank from one of his tank troops and they established the road block by 1600 hrs. They saw approximately 50 Pak soldiers approaching their road block. Across the years, Major General Batra says resolutely, “I could feel strong sense of revenge amongst our boys for the massacre at Kushtia. The tanks (Maj Batra sat himself on the gunners seat as he says to kill these Ba xxxxxs) and 5 Maratha Light Infantry boys opened fire and more than 30 Pak soldiers lay dead. For them it was a “Savage Revenge”. After last light, the Pakistanis again launched yet another attack and it was repulsed with heavy casualties to them. They made yet another attempt on 16 December morning to dislodge them but failed miserably. The Cdr was with them, close by, wherever the action was, egging them on, meeting the wounded and doing real time coordinating and planning, his energy levels and can do attitude were a great motivator.  Finally, the Pakistanis gave up and surrendered to 62 Mountain Brigade. So observe Major General Batra and other veterans who spoke to me, it was a great experience to withstand four counter attacks at night, launched with fury and fire. The battles were fought bitterly and no quarter asked or given. The PT76 had a limited night capability, yet the 45 Cavalry acquitted itself with honour. The surrender was the icing on the cake so to say.  At this surrender event, Gen Ansari, GOC Pakistan 9 Infantry Division admitted to the Commander 62 Mountain Brigade that they could not believe that tanks will get across the formidable Madhumati river and that too at night. One of the Pakistan officers complimented the A Squadron by calling the them the, “Tank Commandos” this my father told me, as I coaxed him to write it down. The credit goes to B Squadron boys too. Gen Batra says he will always remember his Cdr for the swagger, the heart full throated laugh, the ability to relate immediately one to one with the troops, coupled with a modesty about his own role, post action, he could be even self effacing. And he could be ruthless too, highly driven yet watching out for his team. 

After this there was no respite, as they resumed their advance on road Kamarkhali-Faridpur. The Squadron including one troop of B Squadron was advancing with two troops up, one troop each astride the axis. The leading troop leader came on radio to inform Major Batra that a Pakistani jeep with a white flag was approaching towards our location. The Squadron halted the advance and deployed tactically with instructions to carry out speculative fire if need arises. Maj Batra came on to the road to meet the occupants of this jeep which halted a few yards from his tank, he met the GSO 1, Lt. Col. Mansoor-Ul-Haq of Pakistan 9 Infantry Division, who had come to work out surrender formalities with the Indian Army. He was a very smart, softspoken gentleman. They searched him and the soldiers accompanying him. His boys searched the jeep and handed over a book wrapped in green silken cloth to him. As a soldier he felt for the Lt Col, as the worst form of humiliation for a soldier is to surrender. The colonel requested if he could keep the book as it was the holy Quran. As he recollects, Gen Batra touched the book to his forehead as a sign of reverence and handed over the holy Quran without hesitation. This little gesture was much appreciated by him and he said, “We really appreciate the Indian Armed Forces for their respect for all religions and being so secular “. Gen Batra says as a young Major he felt very proud of our culture, our country and our armed forces. They chatted for quite some time about the futility of wars between the two nations with same habits, culture, that we were one country, blamed the politicians for this mess etc etc. The Pakistanis were offered them a cup of tea which was politely declined. In the meantime, a message had been passed to higher headquarters about the surrender and staff from division and brigade headquarters had landed up.

It was a great moment for 45 Cavalry, squadron and him but sadly and it seems it still rankles somewhat, some from the Indian side turned it into a “Tamasha” , maybe it was excitement but the sanctity of the moment should have been appreciated. By this time, some other Pakistani officers had also come over. As he (Maj Batra) stood alone watching, an elderly Pakistani officer walked upto me, introduced himself and said, “Maj Batra, your armoured corps officers on both sides have strong spirit-do-corps and affinity, I’ve a son who is in 4 Cavalry of Pakistan and I’ve had no news about him for over a month. We have no news about war in the Western front and I am worried, he is my only child”.

Well, they did contact a friend at Command Headquarters at Calcutta (now Kolkatta) and requested him to find out whereabouts of 4 Cavalry. He was very kind and appreciated the concern of a father. Next day early morning, Maj Batra was transmitted a message that the 4 Cavalry of Pakistan had not come to battle. He immediately conveyed this to the Pakistani Officer, who was so overwhelmed, that he hugged him and kissed his hands with tears of joy rolling down both his cheeks and kept blessing me. This was a moment difficult to describe by both of us.

Well, the GOC of the Pak 9 Inf Divn surrendered to the Cdr 62 Mtn Bde. Maj Batra got to drive around the jeep of the jeep of the GOC. It was a time of heady excitement. Every Officer up the hierarchy was ready to claim some role in the victory, while they regrouped and waited for the next orders. Then came the summons from the Div HQs that in view of the developments on the Western Front, the A Squadron had to move immediately to Suratgarh. Gen Batra recalls, “I looked up to the skies and wondered on the irony---from marshy graves of Bangladesh to scorpion/snake infested sand dunes of Rajasthan”. Since he had gone to the Div HQs, he paid respects to the GOC as courtesy demanded. The GOC complimented Maj Batra wholeheartedly and the parting words were “I’ll be recommending you and your boys for gallantry/awards”. Ceasefire too had been announced.

In the chaos of war and victory and what not, the A Sqn suddenly found itself alone. But the Commander certainly found time and addressed a few of the men from "A"Sqn of the 45 Cav. Other men also joined in. Nòbody from the Division or any other Brigade (they were associated with another Brigade too) came. This does happen. He complimented 45 Cav for being a  Gallant ,competent and motivated force and with a spirited leadership like the Sqn Cdr. He emphasized that A Sqn had led by example and stayed steadfast and true to its motto “Veer Bhogya Vasundhra”. He wished the 45 Cavalry a bright future and all the best. Emotional he certainly was and it was clearly evident to his men though he struggled to contain his emotions. He promised to visit the Regt at the earliest opportunity. As he finished, it was a truly inspiring and spoken from the heart address by a Military Leader, the men, who were certainly very moved, let out a full throated “CDR SAAB KI JAI”, It resonated across the fields. Then Gen (then Brig) Nath thanked Maj Batra and wished him all the best and left.

Over the years, Maj Gen PK Batra does feel as to why the tank’ men are treated like step children. I would agree as to this battle particularly. After a dozen of actions/ battles at Div / Brigade level including two road blocks, facing five counter attacks to dislodge them, crossing the Madhumati River under the enemy’s nose on a pitch dark night and covering 700 kms without a single breakdown in 20 days of war and the only memory you actually carry sadly is false promises. A sad fact as the glory went to Regiments and Battalions from the Eastern Bangladesh and Northern Bangladesh side as they made the dash to Dacca. The Corps of which 45 Cavalry was a part, well, history records they went off on another tangent mid way through. To all who were there, my regards, to the units, from the Sepoy to the CO, to one and all. You gave it your best, you were there and that is what is important. History will acknowledge you. Thank you for your service. 

Tailpiece – Later, after deployment at Suratgarh, Maj Batra sent his boys on spot of leave. Finally, in February 72, he went on short leave to Ramgarh where his family was staying at the Cantonment. A prisoner-of-war camp had also been established there. One evening as he went for a walk, he stopped at the camp and met the Pakistani Subedar Major and enquired about their welfare. He said,” Hazoor Sab theek hai, koi gila yah shikait nahin, ek chhoti urz hai”, I said “farmaiye”, “Hazoor har subah hamain is gane ke saath uthaya jata hai “maar dia jaye ya chhor diya jai bol tere saath kya salook Kia jaye” (translated, the Pakistani Subedar Major requested that the song was repeatedly playing, should we leave you or kill you. Tell us what kind of treatment you want.) He was assured him that we follow Geneva conventions unlike their army and they will go back to their country eventually and requested the adjutant of the camp to not to play this number.

(Note – Dad passed away on 18^th Jan 2024. I asked him over the years as to why he did not write about the battle in his own well appreciated book, Military Leadership in India. He simply stated, because it hurts when I try to write, I don’t I don’t know what more I could have done to get the due recognition for the boys. This has stayed with me, the human angle,  as in my piece, Down Madhumati Road. Dad did write his memory of the battle and gave it to the 45 Cavalry, I have a copy of the same. Gen Batra wants me to emphasise that my father as the Brigade Commander had the maximum at stake yet calmly and resolutely not only took the decision to ford the river but to demonstrate his commitment sat on the hull of the lead tank. He says My Cdr is up there now, where the warriors find a place  of honour, as and when his time comes, he would be happy to be with his Cdr again. They succeeded. The know it ).

(Veer Bhogya Vasundhara” - The brave shall inherit the earth. Or The Earth is meant to be ruled by the Brave). 

my father is the officer with the pistol in a holster

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------